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Banks continue to di￿er in many ways, for instance with respect to business models,
growth strategies, or ￿nancial health. Neglecting these di￿erences confuses ine￿-
ciency with heterogeneity while sub-sample estimation prohibits e￿ciency compar-
isons across di￿erent samples. We use a latent class stochastic frontier model to
estimate simultaneously multiple technology regimes and group membership prob-
abilities. The latter are conditioned on six bank traits of German banks and we
identify four signi￿cantly di￿erent technology regimes. Only small, retail focused
banks exhibit cost ine￿ciencies, which are 5.4% on average and thus substantially
lower compared to previous studies. We use technology regime speci￿c cost param-
eters to measure competition with Lerner indices. Large, national universal banks
and the smallest, most specialized banks exhibit the lowest level of competition. In
turn, medium sized universal banks are both e￿cient and exhibit the lowest Lerner
margins between 1994 and 2004.
Keywords: Banks; competition; e￿ciency; latent class frontier; strategy
JEL: G21; L1Non-technical summary
The German banking industry is often described as a three pillar system com-
prised of commercial, cooperative, and savings banks. This taxonomy serves as an
almost natural de￿nition of market segments. But in addition to this classi￿cation,
banks might also be grouped within and across pillars according to other criteria, for
instance, business models, ￿nancial health, or growth strategies. Given these syste-
matic di￿erences, many comparative studies select a priori sub-samples of ’compara-
ble’ banks. However, any a priori selection of banking groups inevitably introduces
some random element into the analysis of competition and prohibits relative e￿-
ciency comparisons across samples.
We suggest a latent class model that allows us to estimate di￿erent technology
regimes rather than having to de￿ne market segments. We estimate bank-speci￿c
probabilities to belong to any such technology regime conditional on bank production
and six bank traits that do not belong to bank’s transformation technology. For each
technology regime we derive Lerner indices to measure competition developments.
We identify four technology regimes: large national universal banks with some
indication of a wholesale focus; medium sized universal banks with pronounced abil-
ities to innovate in terms of technical change; very small specialized banks that
presumably focus on relationship banking; and a large group of small retail banks.
While the majority of banks located in groups 3 and 4 exhibit cost ine￿ciency on the
order of ￿ve percent, the ￿rst two groups do not deviate systematically from their
respective group-speci￿c frontiers. Hence, di￿erent technology regimes imply much
lower mean ine￿ciency since they distinguish the former from systematic di￿erences.
Technology regimes also di￿er signi￿cantly regarding competitiveness and riski-
ness. The groups comprising large (inter)nationally active universal and very small,
highly specialized retail banks exhibit both the highest frequency of distress (riski-
ness) and the highest Lerner margins. This suggests the existence of di￿erent busi-
ness models that are more risky but also o￿er higher returns. In turn, the group of
medium sized universal banks, of which more than half are savings banks, show si-
multaneously high e￿ciency and low Lerner margins. Overall, competition declined
in all four regimes up and until 2001 but increased thereafter. At the same time, the
average level of competition is relatively high compared to other European studies.Nichttechnische Zusammenfassung
Das deutsche Bankwesen wird oft als Drei-S￿ulen-System bezeichnet, welches
aus Sparkassen, Gesch￿fts-, und Genossenschaftsbanken besteht. Diese Systematik
wird oft als geradezu nat￿rliche Marktsegmentierung verstanden. Banken k￿nnen
sich jedoch auch zwischen und innerhalb der drei S￿ulen hinsichtlich anderer Krite-
rien unterscheiden, zum Beispiel Wachstumsstrategien, Stabilit￿tseigenschaften oder
Gesch￿ftsmodellen. Viele vergleichenden Studien de￿nieren oftmals vorab Teilstich-
proben, um diese Unterschiede zu ber￿cksichtigen. Jede Bildung von Bankengruppen
beinhaltet jedoch unweigerlich eine zum Teil willk￿rliche Komponente und verhin-
dert au￿erdem den Vergleich relativer E￿zienzma￿e zwischen Teilstichproben.
In dieser Studie benutzen wir ein latent class frontier model (LCFM), um un-
terschiedliche Technologiegruppen empirisch zu sch￿tzen anstatt sie zu de￿nieren.
Wir ermitteln die Wahrscheinlichkeit der Gruppenzugeh￿rigkeit (GZW) je Bank in
Abh￿ngigkeit von sechs individuellen Charakteristika. F￿r jede Technologiegruppe
leiten wir Wettbewerbsma￿e ab und untersuchen deren Entwicklung zwischen 1994
und 2004.
Wir identi￿zieren vier unterschiedliche Gruppen: gro￿e, (inter)national t￿tige
Universalbanken, mittelgro￿e Universalbanken mit ausgepr￿gtem technologischen
Fortschritt, sehr kleine, spezialisierte Banken und eine gro￿e Gruppe kleiner Banken.
Die meisten Banken sind in den Gruppen 3 und 4 enthalten und weisen eine Inef-
￿zienz von etwa 5% auf. Die beiden ersten Gruppen weichen jedoch nicht syste-
matisch von ihren jeweiligen Kostenoptima ab. Die Ber￿cksichtigung unterschied-
licher Technologiegruppen f￿hrt somit zu einer niedrigeren Kostenine￿zienz, weil
systematische Unterschiede besser ber￿cksichtigt werden.
Technologiegruppen unterscheiden sich auch hinsichtlich Wettbewerb und Risiko.
Die Gruppen gro￿er Universalbanken und kleiner Spezialisten weisen die meisten
Ausfallereignisse und die h￿chsten Lerner Indizes auf. Dies deutet auf Gesch￿ftsmo-
delle hin, welche mehr Risiko, jedoch auch h￿here Margen beinhalten. Im Gegensatz
hierzu sind die Lerner Indizes der Gruppe 2 im Mittel am niedrigsten w￿hrend die
durchschnittliche E￿zienz sehr hoch ist. Diese Gruppe mittelgro￿er Universalbanken
umfasst etwa zur H￿lfte Sparkassen. Insgesamt hat die Wettbewerbsintensit￿t bis
2001 in allen Gruppen zugenommen. Seitdem steigen Lerner Indizes wieder an, je-
doch von einem recht niedrigen Niveau aus.Contents
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competition and e￿ciency in banking 1
1 Introduction
E￿ciency comparisons of European banks are important given the ongoing integra-
tion of the single market and the implications for competition. But banks continue
to di￿er in many respects, which necessitates to distinguish ine￿ciency from other
systematic di￿erences in comparative studies (Bos and Schmiedel, 2007; Berger,
2007). Di￿erences concern, for instance, business models (universal versus special),
growth strategies (mergers versus organic), or ￿nancial health. Most e￿ciency stud-
ies therefore pursue two approaches to deal with this challenge.
The ￿rst strand of the literature separates bank samples a priori into ’compara-
ble’ peer groups.2 Mester (1993, 1997) restricts the estimation of cost frontiers to
speci￿c banking groups and U.S. states, respectively. She rejects the hypothesis of
identical cost parameters and concludes that benchmarking these banks against each
other in a pooled frontier analysis is inappropriate. But meaningful priors, such as
market delineations constituted by U.S. states prior to the Branching Act in 1996,
are often unavailable and also change over time. Therefore, any a priori selection of
’adequate’ peer groups is inevitably arbitrary to some extent. Moreover, e￿ciency
scores are relative measures, which prohibits comparisons across di￿erent samples
(Coelli et al., 2005). Therefore, inference relying on estimated parameters cannot be
drawn from separate estimations. This is particularly cumbersome for European pol-
icy makers since competition studies using Lerner indices, for example Angelini and
Cetorelli (2003) and FernÆndez de Guevara et al. (2007), use cost function parame-
ter and e￿ciency estimates to assess the success (or failure) to enhance competitive
behavior.3
A second strand in the literature therefore accounts for Mester’s important cri-
tique by specifying additional controls to distinguish systematic di￿erences across
banks from ine￿ciency (see, for example, Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas, 2000; Maudos
1The opinions expressed here are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Deutsche
Bundesbank. We are grateful to the Bundesbank for the provision of data. This paper is part of
a research project sponsored by the foundation ’Geld und W￿hrung’. Michael Koetter gratefully
acknowledges support from the Netherland’s Organization for Scienti￿c Research NWO.
2A priori sample selection is not con￿ned to bank e￿ciency studies. For example, Porath (2006)
and Stolz and Wedow (2005) restrict their analyses of default probabilities and capital bu￿ers to
sub-samples of German banks, too.
3Both the Panzar-Rose approach as well as Lerner indices rely on cost function parameter
estimates to generate either the H-statistic or scaled Lerner margins as proxies of competition. See
Bikker and Haaf (2002) for an overview.
1et al., 2002; Casu and Molyneux, 2003). Additional controls usually reduce ine￿-
ciency estimates. In fact, Valverde et al. (2007) report that cost ine￿ciencies vanish
almost entirely after accounting for environmental and industry trends in the kernel
of a cost frontier for a sample of Spanish savings and commercial banks. But already
Deprins and Simar (1989) pointed out that it is often hard to determine if a covari-
ate is part of the objective function of decision making units, or if it constitutes a
determinant of deviations from it’s frontier. 4 Related, Bos et al. (2008) con￿rm that
adding controls to the frontier’s kernel reduces ine￿ciency. But specifying the same
controls as determinants of the ine￿ciency distribution actually decreases e￿ciency.
Thus, there remain considerable ambiguities regarding (i) which banks to com-
pare and (ii) how to account for systematic di￿erences. We suggest in this paper a
novel parametric method in the vein of Orea and Kumbhakar (2004) and Greene
(2005). We avoid any a priori grouping of banks and formulate a stochastic frontier
model as a latent variable problem. Technology regimes can di￿er and bank’s prob-
ability to be part of one particular regime is estimated simultaneously with frontier
parameters and e￿ciency scores. Regime membership probabilities are estimated
conditional on a number of bank traits. This approach has the advantage to remain
entirely agnostic as to the number and composition of banking regimes. The model
allows us to test the existence of systematically di￿erent groups of banks according
to criteria approximating banks business strategy, their ￿nancial health, and growth
strategies.
In extension to Orea and Kumbhakar (2004) and Greene (2005), we also provide
evidence on the implications of di￿erent technology regimes regarding the compet-
itive stance of German banks. Similar to FernÆndez de Guevara et al. (2007), we
employ cost frontier estimates to measure competition by means of Lerner indices.
In contrast to previous Lerner studies (see e.g. Angelini and Cetorelli, 2003) we thus
avoid the use of biased parameters due to the neglect of a composed error term.
With respect to FernÆndez de Guevara et al. (2007), we seek to complement their
evidence in two important respects. First, we allow for systematically di￿erent tech-
nology regimes by using group-speci￿c cost frontier parameters. Second, the use of
con￿dential ￿nancial accounts data provided by the Bundesbank allows us to specify
bank outputs in a more detailed fashion compared to the aggregate measures used
in their study.
Our main result is evidence in favor of four signi￿cantly di￿erent technology
regimes among German universal banks. Only two regimes employ input factors
4Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) provides a comprehensive overview how environmental and other
controls can a￿ect e￿ciency. Greene (2005) suggests a number of alternative estimators as how to
deal with heterogeneity in panel frontier settings.
2systematically ine￿cient after allowing for di￿erent technologies. The competitive
behavior among large, wholesale and very small, specialized and presumably rela-
tionship focused banks is the lowest. High Lerner margins, however, are accompanied
by the largest distress frequencies. Hence, this result indicates that some interme-
diation technologies simply incur more risks, but also yield higher margins. The
group with the largest share of savings banks also yields full e￿ciency. Simultane-
ously, Lerner indices are low. This indicates that such medium sized retail banks
presumably pass the bene￿ts from operational e￿ciency and close to optimal scale
operations on to consumers.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. First, we introduce the
latent class stochastic frontier model, regime membership determinants, and the
approach to obtain Lerner indices of competition in section 2. Results are presented
in section 3. We conclude in section 4.
2 Methodology
2.1 Latent cost frontiers
As most bank e￿ciency studies, we follow the intermediation approach and assume
that banks minimize costs C by choosing optimal input quantities x∗(y,w) at given
input prices w to provide a certain monetary volume of ￿nancial services and prod-
ucts given their technology constraint (Sealey and Lindley, 1977). Deviations from
optimal cost C∗ in year t can either be due to random noise or suboptimal employ-
ment of inputs. A baseline stochastic cost frontier for a bank k is then:
lnCkt = f(ykt,wkt,trend;β) + εkt, (1)
where lower case letters indicate logs, trend is an interacted time trend to capture
technical change and β is a vector of parameters to be estimated. The total error in
equation (1) is εkt = vkt + ukt, where vkt denotes random noise, and ukt stands for
deviations due to ine￿ciency. To identify the model we use standard distributional
assumptions on error term components and impose the required restrictions. 5
The most frequent approaches entail to either estimate equation (1) for an a
priori selection of di￿erent samples (Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas, 2000; Maudos et al.,
2002; Casu and Molyneux, 2003) and/or to augment the frontier with further control
5Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) review and discuss alternative error term assumptions. Here, we
assume vkt is i.i.d. and vkt ∼ N(0,σ2
v) and ukt is i.i.d.N|(0,σ2
u)|. Point estimates of cost e￿ciency
are obtained by E(ukt|εkt).
3variables zkt (Mester, 1993, 1997).6 This maintains the implicit assumption of one
single (augmented) production technology for all banks.
Instead, we allow for di￿erent technology regimes, where membership proba-
bilities are conditional on a set of control variables zkt as suggested in Orea and
Kumbhakar (2004) and Greene (2005). This approach allows us to remain agnos-
tic as to which banks belong into which group. In fact, we can test the predictive
power of certain bank traits and institutional factors to discern di￿erent technology
regimes. We write the latent class stochastic frontier model as:
lnCkt|j = f(ykt|j,wkt|j,trend;βj) + vkt|j + ukt|j. (2)
The di￿erence of the latent class equation (2) and the frontier model in equation
(1) is that parameters di￿er across the latent classes j = 1,...,J. Equation (2)
is estimated with maximum likelihood methods where the likelihood function is
depicted by Greene (2005) as:














and Φ is the CDF. Conditional on the bank being in class j, the contribution of





The unconditional likelihood for each ￿rm is averaged over the latent classes











In equation (5), the term P(k,j) is the prior probability that is attached to mem-
bership of bank k to class j. Note that this is based on the observed data rather than
any a priori grouping. Banks reside in a class permanently and group membership
probability depends on characteristics zkt. To estimate group memberships, we use







for πJ = 0. (6)
6Control variables can be speci￿ed in the kernel, the expected value of the ine￿ciency distri-
bution, or the variance of the ine￿ciency distribution. However, Bos et al. (2008) show that such
control variables zkt might a￿ect both banks’ abilities to attain the frontier or the location of the
frontier itself.
4where the last group serving as the reference group and zkt are ￿rm speci￿c
characteristics that determine class membership.
2.2 Technology determinants and data
In line with the intermediation approach, we specify four volume measures of output
y1 to y4: interbank loans, customer loans, securities, and o￿-balance sheet activities.
Banks employ ￿xed assets, labor, and borrowed funds denoted as w1 through w3,
respectively. As dependent variable we specify total operating cost C. All variables
are obtained from ￿nancial accounts reported to the Bundesbank between 1994 and
2004. Table 1 shows descriptive statistics.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of German banks 1994-2004
Variable Mean Stdv Percentile
5th 95th
Interbank loans y1 406.0 4713.7 2.4 311.0
Customer loans y2 804.4 7332.1 14.1 1580.0
Securities y3 388.5 4157.2 4.4 669.0
O￿-balance sheet y4 231.5 3246.4 0.7 178.0
Price of ￿xed assets w1 22.4 499.7 7.1 33.9
Price of labor w2 52.0 161.9 36.4 65.1
Price of borrowed funds w3 3.6 3.1 2.4 4.7
Cost C 10.4 67.8 0.1 27.6
Equity z1 61.0 535.0 1.5 119.0
Mortgages z2 37.3 23.8 0.0 79.0




Notes: 29,695 observations. All monetary values denoted in millions of 2000 Euros
unless noted otherwise. Labor cost in thousands of Euro per employee (FTE). Funding
and ￿xed asset cost as well as shares of public banks, mergers, and distressed events
in percentages. Number of branches to total assets (in billions).
We also depict in the bottom panel of table 1 covariates to determine group
membership. The ￿rst is equity as to control in the vein of Mester (1993) for di￿erent
risk preferences and funding structures across banks. We specify equity not as part
of the deterministic kernel but as a determinant of regime membership given it’s
role to serve as a signal of ￿nancial health and risk preferences of the bank.
Second, we control for bank’s share of real estate loans in long-term lending. Uni-
versal banks in Germany are allowed to venture into virtually any line of business.
Bank failure studies, for example by Harrison and Ragas (1995) and Gan (2004),
show that larger exposures to real estate markets increase the odds of bank distress.
5Additionally, Davis and Zhu (2005) point out that banks can also be a￿ected in-
directly. Adverse price developments can put bank customers at jeopardy, thereby
causing subsequent (non-mortgage) credit failures and performance deteriorations
at banks without large direct exposures, too.
Third, we account for distinctively di￿erent business models among German uni-
versal banks. Large commercial banks operate nationwide as well as in international
￿nancial markets and engage extensively in wholesale and investment banking ac-
tivities. The vast majority of banks, in turn, is small in size and regional in scope
(Hackethal, 2004). Regarding the latter, both local savings banks and cooperative
banks explicitly aim to provide comparably small corporate and private customers
with ￿nancial services. This focus on small and medium enterprises and private
customers usually implies relatively extensive branching networks, which might be
detrimental to bank e￿ciency (Lang and Welzel, 1999). Therefore, we control for
the number of branches per billion of Euros in total bank assets.
Fourth, we specify a direct measure of bank’s ￿nancial health as a determinant
of it’s technology regime membership. Williams (2004) reports for European savings
banks that it is primarily bad management that deprives e￿ciency. Related, Hughes
et al. (2000) show that accounting explicitly for di￿erent risk-characteristics across
banks yields substantially di￿erent e￿ciency, productivity, and performance results
in benchmarking exercises.7 We use observed distress events collected by the Bundes-
bank as a determinant of systematically di￿erent production technologies given the
quality and riskiness of the bank. Distressed events are de￿ned pursuant to the credit
act and guidelines issued by the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin ).
The data comprise obligatory noti￿cations from banks in line with the credit act,
compulsory noti￿cations about losses amounting to 25 percent of the liable capital,
a decline of operational pro￿ts by more than 25 percent, or more direct measures
forwarded by the BaFin, for example o￿cial warnings to the bank CEO, orders to
restructure operations, restrictions to lending and deposit taking, and dismissal of
the bank CEO.8
The ￿fth control indicates if another bank was acquired. Previous evidence shows
that bank mergers do either yield no or small cost e￿ciency gains (Lang and Welzel,
1999; Focarelli et al., 2002; Koetter, 2008). Potentially, the integration of targets is
relatively factor intensive compared to ’business-as-usual’ among non-merging peers.
Also, a number of studies show that absorbed banks are ￿nancially weak and merg-
ers provide a mean to let these banks exit the market without disrupting the system
7For example, a bank that is more risk-inclined might also yield a more productive intermedi-
ation technology.
8A more detailed data description can be found in Kick and Koetter (2007).
6(Koetter et al., 2007). This would further explain lower cost e￿ciency due to merg-
ers. However, immediate ine￿ciencies may be the price banks pay to attain more
productive intermediation technologies, for example by reaping larger economies
of scale, by diversifying revenue sources, and complementing existing product and
service portfolios. Mergers might thus help to identify technology regimes and asso-
ciated e￿ciency estimates. Finally, a dummy variable controls for public ownership
of the bank.
2.3 Competition
We expect to identify distinctively di￿erent technology regimes among German
banks conditional on these six characteristics. The implications of di￿erent technol-
ogy regimes, in turn, go beyond the mere documentation of bank-speci￿c e￿ciency
scores measured against appropriate frontiers. Instead, di￿erent cost function pa-
rameters obtained for each regime also imply di￿erent estimates of bank’s marginal
costs.
This a￿ects competition measures, too, since these often rely on estimated cost
function parameters. Akin to Angelini and Cetorelli (2003) and Maudos and Guevara
(2007) we therefore use Lerner indices to assess the competitive behavior of indi-
vidual banks. Competition is measured as the (scaled) di￿erence between average





In competitive markets, marginal cost equal average revenues. Therefore, low
values of Lerner indices L indicate more competition and vice versa. Most studies
estimating Lerner indices obtain marginal cost estimates from cost function speci￿-
cations similar to equation (1) with two important di￿erences. First, most studies
specify aggregate output proxies, such as total assets or total loans (Angelini and
Cetorelli, 2003). Second, with the exception of FernÆndez de Guevara et al. (2007),
virtually no competition study accounts for the bias in cost function parameters
when neglecting the composed error term component. Additionally, we account for
the group speci￿c di￿erences of cost frontier parameters. Marginal costs equal scale











Note that in extension to Angelini and Cetorelli (2003) partial cost derivatives
account for ine￿ciency since we obtain them with stochastic frontier analysis. Fur-
7ther, we specify four outputs m = 1,..,4 instead of only one or two (sub)aggregates
(FernÆndez de Guevara et al., 2007). This allows us to distinguish more carefully
for the product mix of banks and it’s implications for the competitiveness. 9 Finally,
Lerner indices Lkt|j are group-speci￿c and are therefore conditional on group mem-
bership determinants z, too. At the same time, we do not impose any a priori group-
ing of banks. Instead, we estimate the likelihood of belonging to a certain regime
with an identical frontier. Estimates of group membership therefore also provide an
indication as to which banks compete with another.
3 Results
First, we need to specify the number of classes J when estimating equations (2)
and (6). As suggested in Greene (2005), we begin by allowing up to ￿ve technology
regimes and then ’test down’ if the model can be reduced to fewer classes. In addition
to log likelihood values (LF) and according LR-tests, we provide in table 2 also the
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) as suggested in Orea and Kumbhakar (2004). 10
Table 2: Speci￿cation tests on number of latent classes
Classes J AIC LF LR-test K
1 -15,432 7,754 0.000 17
2 -27,975 14,068 0.000 36
3 -38,835 19,538 0.000 54
4 -43,128 22,025 0.000 72
5 -42,285 21,344 n/a 90
Notes: Observations: N; AIC = −2lnLF(J) + 2m; LR − test =
−2[LF(R) − LF(U)]; where LF is the log-likelihood value, J is the
number of classes, K is the number of parameters, and U and R un-
restricted and restricted LF values, respectively.
Information criteria support univocally a latent class speci￿cation with four
regimes. Note, that information criteria in table 2 are based on unconditional latent
class estimations, i.e. excluding the vector of controls z in equation (6). Qualitatively,
results are identical for tests including a slightly reduced vector z.11
9Ideally, we would match product-speci￿c marginal cost with according revenue streams to assess
competition per output category. Unfortunately, product-speci￿c income ￿ows are not available.
10The preferred model is supported by low AIC and high LF values. LR-tests conducted for the
previous latent class model with J − 1 classes.
11A model with ￿ve latent classes and all controls is overspeci￿ed and could not be maximized.
Therefore, we report here test results without z. We also tested the translog functional form includ-
ing factor and output interaction terms. The large number of parameters implied overspeci￿cation
and maximization problems, too. Since interaction terms have no economic meaning but help to
approximate the data in a more ￿exible fashion, we prefer here to avoid inherent multicollinearity
8Consider therefore parameter estimates of both the deterministic kernel and tech-
nology regime membership determinants from a latent class model with four groups
in table 3. It is important to note that parameters are obtained simultaneously for
each group. Before turning to a more in-depth description of group characteristics,
already these results indicate signi￿cant di￿erences across classes. 12
Table 3: Latent cost frontier and group determinants
Class 1 2 3 4
Kernel βj p value βj p value βj p value βj p value
Intercept -1.472 0.033 -2.153 1.000 -1.264 0.000 -3.178 0.000
w1 0.132 0.000 -0.035 0.000 0.144 0.000 0.004 0.088
w2 0.315 0.000 0.720 0.000 0.065 0.000 0.113 0.000
y1 0.211 0.000 0.202 0.000 0.035 0.000 0.118 0.000
y2 0.617 0.000 0.231 0.000 0.755 0.000 0.567 0.000
y3 0.100 0.000 0.569 0.000 0.045 0.000 0.295 0.000
y4 -0.070 0.000 -0.128 0.000 0.021 0.000 0.001 0.215
Time -0.063 0.000 -0.106 0.000 -0.049 0.000 -0.049 0.000
Time2 -0.006 0.000 0.002 0.006 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.000
Time × y1 -0.006 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.003 0.000 -0.003 0.000
Time × y2 -0.011 0.000 0.042 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.012 0.000
Time × y3 0.018 0.000 -0.049 0.000 -0.002 0.000 -0.010 0.000
Time × y4 0.002 0.019 0.012 0.000 -0.001 0.007 0.001 0.000
Time × w1 0.001 0.214 0.019 0.000 -0.001 0.395 0.003 0.000
Time × w2 0.030 0.000 -0.051 0.000 0.004 0.050 0.023 0.000
σ 0.191 0.000 0.240 0.000 0.149 0.000 0.158 0.000
λ 0.074 0.987 0.000 1.000 0.579 0.000 3.091 0.000
Group determinants πj p value πj p value πj p value πj p value
Intercept -9.716 0.000 5.380 0.000 -2.140 0.015 - control group -
Equity 0.667 0.000 -0.555 0.000 0.117 0.040 - control group -
Mortgages -0.082 0.000 0.000 0.985 -0.025 0.000 - control group -
Distress 0.094 0.055 0.021 0.770 0.135 0.002 - control group -
Branches 0.007 0.000 0.022 0.000 -0.017 0.103 - control group -
Mergers -1.242 0.000 -1.702 0.000 -0.955 0.063 - control group -
Public -3.948 0.000 3.017 0.000 -0.688 0.003 - control group -
Observations 3,227 1,872 3,589 21,007
Notes: 29,695 observations; 3,524 banks; dependent variable is lnC; LF: 23,015; σ = σu + σv; λ =
σu/σv.
Ine￿ciency does not prevail in all technology regimes. Estimates of λ are only
signi￿cant in groups 3 and 4. Since these groups are the largest, the result that
most banks forego some resources systematically is in line with previous evidence.
However, our results also highlight that ine￿ciencies do not exist in two technology
regimes accounting for approximately a quarter of all banks.
Fully e￿cient technology regimes may indicate well-established technologies and
standardized processes. Potentially, banks in these groups are very experienced to
operate these technologies and therefore incur little or no systematic operational
slack. In turn, this might also imply that banks in these groups exhibit fairly low or
no technological progress if ine￿ciencies are more likely present when innovating.
problems. We add ￿exibility by allowing for di￿erent technology classes conditioned on controls z
which permit economic inference and interaction terms regarding the time trend.
12We conducted Wald tests on both the joint and individual identity between parameters of
di￿erent groups. The vast majority of tests reject that both production technology and regime
membership coe￿cients are equal across groups.
9Parameter estimates of time trends con￿rm di￿erences across groups and we describe
below each technology regime also in terms of technological change, measured by
partial derivatives of cost w.r.t these parameters.
Consider beforehand that parameters for both kernel and the six group deter-
minants in the bottom panel of table 3 are almost all signi￿cant at the 1%-level.
Especially the latter is important since it highlights that group membership prob-
abilities can be estimated rather than being imposed. But the e￿ects of individual
controls di￿er at times substantially across technology regimes. For example, better
capitalized banks are, relative to the control group, more likely to be in the second
regime and less likely to be a member in the ￿rst regime. While both groups are
fully e￿cient, as indicated by insigni￿cant λ’s, this indicates already fundamental
di￿erences between these two group’s risk-taking attitude.
Technology and group membership parameters show that even within one coun-
try signi￿cantly di￿erent bank technology regimes exist. Simultaneous estimation
of group-speci￿c frontiers permits a comparison of relative e￿ciency measures and
highlights that in Germany around a quarter of the sample did not incur signi￿cant
operational slack between 1994 and 2004. To assess the characteristics of identi￿ed
technology regimes, we describe each group in table 4 in terms of speci￿ed group
membership determinants and economic performance indicators derived from ancil-
lary calculations based on estimated latent class parameters.
The top panel in table 4 provides the mean and standard deviation of vari-
ables speci￿ed in the latent class model. The ￿rst technology regime includes the
largest banks, as measured by the level of equity. 13 This group exhibits below av-
erage involvement in mortgage lending activities but maintains the most extensive
branching networks. The former suggests that these banks are less focused on retail
banking activities. The latter, in turn, is in line with nation wide operations with
relatively many representations. When comparing the classi￿cation based on the
latent class model to the three pillar taxonomy of commercial, savings, and coop-
erative banks, we ￿nd in fact that this group is dominated by commercial, central
savings and cooperative bank-year observations. Moreover, the output portfolio in
terms of speci￿ed outputs ym is the most diversi￿ed one across groups, yielding a
Hirschman-Her￿ndahl-Index (HHI) across the four outputs of 2,789. Therefore, we
classify group 1 as large, national universal banking regime. Note also that this tech-
nology regime exhibits the highest frequency of distress events. This may indicate
that a larger appetite for risk is characteristic for this banking regime. At the same
13We also checked total assets, which con￿rm inference drawn based on equity levels. Also, we
analyzed capitalization ratios since equity levels alone might not convey all information. Equity
ratios did not di￿er signi￿cantly across groups and are therefore not reported to conserve on space.
10time, Lerner indices are considerably larger than the overall industry average, sug-
gesting that higher risks also enable banks to realize higher margins. 14 In contrast
to many other banking studies, we also ￿nd that these very large banks still face
considerable scale economies. Large banks thus seem to face indeed a signi￿cantly
di￿erent production technology for which we account here. The relatively large share
of mergers indicates that banks in this technology regime aim to grow by acquiring
other banks more actively than other groups. At the same time, technical change
estimates suggest no success to reduce costs by innovating.
Table 4: Characteristics per group
Group 1 2 3 4 All
Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Mean Stdev
Equity1) 196.1 1,324.4 71.9 286.9 20.8 84.5 46.1 351.4 61.0 535.0
Mortgages2) 20.9 21.6 38.6 22.6 34.0 28.7 40.3 22.2 37.3 23.8
Distress2) 16.5 84.6 8.9 60.6 11.9 73.6 7.8 59.8 9.3 64.8
Branches3) 48.1 51.8 37.0 40.3 32.0 39.7 35.0 34.5 36.2 38.0
Merger2) 6.8 27.2 7.6 32.4 3.0 18.4 5.9 27.3 5.7 26.7
Public2) 4.0 19.6 53.2 49.9 8.2 27.4 23.3 42.3 21.3 40.9
Scale Economies2) 87.0 0.7 94.5 3.3 86.8 0.6 97.6 0.2 94.9 4.5
Technical change2) 1.4 1.8 -1.9 6.6 0.2 0.7 1.0 0.8 0.7 2.0
Cost e￿ciency2) 99.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 96.8 1.0 93.1 3.9 94.6 4.1
Lerner index2) 21.5 15.1 15.8 20.6 25.0 8.2 16.8 5.5 18.2 9.5
Observations 3,227 1,872 3,589 21,007 29,695
Notes: 29,697 observations; 3,524 banks; 1)in millions of Euro; 2)in percent; 3)number. Scale
economies:
P
m lnCkt|j/lnymkt|j; Technical change: ∂ lnCkt|j/∂trend.
Banks in the second technology regime are on average much smaller but still the
second largest group and also fully e￿cient. In contrast to group 1, mean mortgage
shares indicate a stronger focus on retail customers. Branching intensity is lower,
which might re￿ect a more regional scope. The output HHI of 3,035 also indicates
diversi￿ed portfolios of a universal banking type. While these banks experienced
substantially less often distressed events than group 2, estimated Lerner margins
are also the lowest. Therefore, these banks did not behave (relatively) uncompeti-
tive. Scale economy estimates indicate an almost optimal size of operation as well as
signi￿cant technical progress. Paired with the highest merger frequency across tech-
nology regimes, this suggests that banks in this group consolidated most e￿ectively
and succeeded to improve performance. The business model of this group appears
to be a low risk-low return strategy and we describe this regime as medium sized
universal retail innovators.
The third technology regime comprises the smallest banks. Retail intensity is low
when considering branching networks and mortgage shares. The small scale paired
with the highest output portfolio concentration of 4,819 and 66% of total assets
being customer loans is indicative of a highly specialized business model. Potentially,
14The overall mean of 18.2 is comparable to results reported by FernÆndez de Guevara et al.
(2007).
11these banks aim to establish ￿rm relationships with customers. The highest Lerner
indices realized in the sample support this notion since such relationship bankers
might be able to extract rents from their customers. At the same time, relatively
high distress frequencies also bear witness that such higher margins involve higher
risks. Large scale economies paired with low merger activity further implies that
these banks are likely to experience future consolidation as to approach a more
productive size of operations. Given this relatively large potential to realize cost
reductions, cost ine￿ciencies on the order of three percent entail only limited room
for improvements. We therefore consider this group small relationship specialists.
The ￿nal group comprises the most banks in our sample. A quarter of these
fairly small banks are public and most of the remaining ones are small cooperative
banks. Their high mortgage share suggests a focus on private rather than corporate
customers. While scale economies still exist, they are small and bear less potential
for improvements compared to operational ine￿ciencies of seven percent of total
cost. Note, however, that overall e￿ciency estimates are substantially lower when
comparing banks to their respective technology regime conditional on bank traits.
This result is in line with, for example, Valverde et al. (2007) who report also that
systematic deviations from optimal cost decline when controlling appropriately for
heterogeneity across ￿rms. Finally, the estimates of Lerner margins indicate that the
vast majority of banks in Germany are fairly competitive since group 4 estimates
are low compared to FernÆndez de Guevara et al. (2007).
Group characteristics are informative to understand the nature of di￿erent tech-
nology regimes in German banking better. In addition, the development of e￿ciency
and competition is of particular interest as to assess whether ongoing deregulation
and international integration also a￿ected German banking positively. It is possible
that both e￿ciency and competition developed di￿erently depending on the respec-
tive technology regimes identi￿ed. Either measure’s evolution is depicted in ￿gure
1.
Overall competition increased for all four technology regimes up and until the
stock market crash at the turn of century. While large wholesale orientated and
small relationship specialists, groups 1 and 3 respectively, were constantly the least
competitive banking regimes, especially the medium sized retail innovators of group
3 exhibit the largest reduction in Lerner indices. Apparently, this group faced most
competitive pressure. Note that e￿ciency was stable for almost all groups over the
sample period. Thus, it appears that large wholesale banks are able (and willing) to
transform their benchmark e￿ciency into higher margins, while group 2 banks are
not (willing to do so).
Since 2001, competition deteriorated in all four technology regimes. Especially









the largest group 4 of fairly small retail banks yields margin hikes of around 50%
between 2001 and 2004. At the same time, banks in this regime exhibited the high-
est ine￿ciency. Given the comparably low level of Lerner indices, this might not
necessarily indicate excessive welfare losses for consumers but rather results from
successful restructuring e￿orts of incumbents remaining in the market after the tur-
moil in ￿nancial markets. In that sense, this result is in line with the model of Boyd
and De Nicolo (2005), who argue that banks remaining in the market after consol-
idation begin to extract rents. However, we caution that an assessment of welfare
implications would require more rigorous analysis, for example using the welfare
triangle as in Berger and Hannan (1998). Here, we limit ourselves to the conclu-
sion that both competition and e￿ciency di￿er signi￿cantly across bank technology
regimes and exhibit also diverging developments during the last decade.
4 Conclusion
In this paper we test for the existence of di￿erent technology regimes among German
universal banks between 1994 and 2004. We estimate simultaneously cost frontiers
and bank’s group membership probabilities, which are conditioned on six indica-
tors of business models (universal versus special), ￿nancial health, growth strategy
(merger versus organic), and ownership (public versus private). Thereby we avoid
13any arbitrary a priori sample selection when estimating comparable e￿ciency scores
on the one hand and Lerner indices as measures of competition on the other.
We ￿nd evidence of four signi￿cantly di￿erent technology regimes among German
universal banks. Large, wholesale oriented and medium sized banks with a retail
focus do not incur signi￿cant ine￿ciencies. The majority of banks are located in
the remaining two regimes and exhibit mean cost ine￿ciency on the order of ￿ve
percent. Hence, allowing for di￿erent technology regimes yields substantially lower
ine￿ciency scores compared to previous e￿ciency studies of German banks (Lang
and Welzel, 1999; Altunbas et al., 2001).
Overall Lerner indices are 18.2 on average, which is comparable to results re-
ported in FernÆndez de Guevara et al. (2007) for Germany and relatively low in
their European comparison. Up and until 2001 competition increased continuously.
Thereafter, we ￿nd that some technology regimes yield Lerner index hikes of up to
50%. Potentially, this result indicates in line with Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) that
once markets consolidated, remaining incumbents begin to reap rents in increasingly
concentrated markets.
The groups comprising large, national universal bank and very small, specialized
banks yield the highest Lerner margins and, thus, the lowest level of competition.
The most competitive group is that of medium sized universal banks that presumably
have a retail focus. Potentially, these banks pass their high operational e￿ciency on
to consumers in the form of lower margins. However, we also ￿nd that technology
regimes exhibiting the largest margins also experienced the highest frequency of
distress. Given the generally low level of Lerner indices, this result might therefore
simply re￿ect that some banking technologies are pursuing higher risk-higher return
strategies while others are less inclined towards risk-taking and associated larger
margins.
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